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In the comprehensive biography Walter Benjamin: A Critical Life, Howard 
Eiland and Michael Jennings describe Benjamin’s childhood in an elite 
bourgeois household as a fertile ground for the child’s evolving intellectual 
curiosity: “Around him was a multifarious Dingwelt, a world of things 
appealing to his well nurtured imagination and his omnivorous imitative 
abilities.”1 The biographers contend that the richness of the material culture 
surrounding the child explicates Benjamin’s reflections on the development 
of self-consciousness. According to these reflections, the child’s self-
perception develops concurrently with his spatial orientation in his 
household, which consisted of a multifaceted and vivacious world of 
objects that affected his senses. 
 
Benjamin’s auto-fictional reflections, titled Berlin Childhood around 1900 
(Berliner Kindheit um neunzehnhundert), portray an emerging persona that 
develops in tandem with echoes of an intrusive surrounding. Disruptions 
that are embedded in modern reality resound in the descriptions of the 
household, as well as in those of Berlin’s sites. The spatial orientation in the 
urban sphere, like in the case of the flâneur in Benjamin’s The Arcades 
Project, famously conveys a documentation of the changing circumstances 
of bourgeois life. In the case of Berlin Childhood, temporal and cultural 
transformations are recorded in the circumstances that lead to the 
emergence of an individual persona. The development of a reflective 
persona thus foregrounds the exploration of a historiographical perspective 
that deprioritizes chronological linearity.     
 
I contend that spirituality is present in the text in two main ways.2 The first 
is the identification of the child as a non-human, a persona that disrupts 
                                                             
1 Eiland, Howard and Michael William Jennings, Walter Benjamin: A Critical Life 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014), 13. 
2 Charles Tart has referred to spirituality as “that vast realm of human potential 
dealing with ultimate purposes, with higher entities, with God, with life, with 
compassion, with purpose.” (1975) “Introduction,” in C. T. Tart (Ed.), Transpersonal 
Psychologies (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), 4. The term is often used 
interchangeably with “religiousness”; notwithstanding the conflation of the two 
terms, spirituality has been associated with human experiences that are 
differentiated from religious orthodoxy and religious institutions, including mystical 
experiences. See Brian J. Zinnbauer, Kenneth I. Pargament, Brenda Cole, Mark S. 
Rye, Eric M. Butter, Timothy G. Belavich, Kathleen M. Hipp, Allie B. Scott and Jill L. 
Kadar, “Religion and Spirituality: Unfuzzying the Fuzzy.” Journal for the Scientific 
Study of Religion 36, no. 4 (1997): 549–564. Charles Taylor’s investigation of religious 
experience in the modern age destines spirituality an eminent role; according to 
Taylor, the term hones the emphasis on subjectivism that is featured in our “Age of 
Authenticity,” an age that preceded a broad rejection of old religious institutions. A 
Secular Age (Cambridge/Boston: Harvard University Press, 2007), 507–508. The 
following inquiry of Benjamin’s disassociation of materiality and stillness (and of 
humanness and agency) employs tropes that transgress institutional religion. The 
essay’s second part will explore this transgression by looking at Benjamin’s 
employment of messianic tropes to dismantle historiographical linearity.      
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normative views on human sentience. The text disrupts the presumption 
that humans are superior to inanimate objects due to their vitality. Second, 
the child’s retrospective gaze employs a non-linear perception of history—a 
perception that is explored in several of Benjamin’s seminal texts through 
the opposition of the messianic (or redemptive) perspective on history to 
the realm of profane historiography. In Berlin Childhood, the child’s 
impressions unfold from the retroactive perspective of a visitor. The child is 
both unborn and a voice that resembles the perspective of an undead that 
revisits the city of Berlin upon the ostensible extinguishing of the 
individuals that populated the city in the story that he tells.  
 
This article investigates the narrator’s sentience in Berlin Childhood as 
grounded in his overall presentation as non-human. I argue that the 
narrator transgresses the view of sentience as a unique human feature by 
challenging the cultural hierarchy of subjects and objects—a hierarchy that 
is governed in human societies by spiritual norms that celebrate living 
bodies and reject the dead. I seek to relate the text’s transgression of the 
animate-inanimate hierarchy to the narrator’s position as a narrator of 
history. In invoking religious tropes constitutive to Benjamin’s writings on 
history, the narrator wears a layer of associations that disconnect his figure 
from the earthly realm. Developing a counterintuitive spiritual experiment, 
i.e. a form of transcendence that is intertwined with inferior inanimate 
objects, Berlin Childhood dispels the view of human beings as history’s 




Domestic Life and the Undead Narrator  
 
The first volume of Karl Ove Knausgård’s multivolume work My Struggle 
explores the spiritual conundrum behind the association of inanimate 
objects with death. When individuals die, they are taken to enter the realm 
of inanimate objects. This realm encompasses human beings’ surroundings 
including domestic spaces and nature. But whereas this realm is associated 
with familiar phenomena and domains of human life, we are repulsed by 
the transformation of humans into inanimate objects: 
The moment life departs the body, the body belongs to the dead. 
Lamps, suitcases, carpets, door handles, windows. Fields, marshes, 
streams, mountains, clouds, the sky. None of these is alien to us. 
We are constantly surrounded by objects and phenomena from the 
realm of the nonliving. Nonetheless, there are few things that 
arouse in us greater distaste than to see a human being caught up 
in it, at least if we are to judge by the efforts we make to keep 
corpses out of sight.3 
 
The uncanny nature of entering the sphere of the nonliving is marked (and 
perpetuated) in keeping corpses hidden. Dead bodies invoke the volatility 
of the human condition; they reveal the liminality of the distinction 
between human life and the realm of the inanimate. Death is the alarming 
threshold that separates the dead from the living, the inanimate from the 
animate. The dead do not merely depart. Rather, they become inanimate 
and penetrate thereby the environments in which we live, including the 
most private ones: our homes, our shelters.  
                                                             
3 A Death in the Family, translated by Don Bartlett (London: Vintage Books, 2013), 3–
4.  
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Berlin Childhood dispels the culturally seminal distinction between the dead 
and the living. The text does so by developing an unconventional depiction 
of the inanimate. Establishing his persona vis-à-vis his relation to inanimate 
domestic objects, the narrator demonstrates an exploration of a unique 
agency that is affiliated with the inanimate or the dead. The auto-fictional 
narrative at the center of the text thus offers a non-hierarchical account of 
animate and inanimate objects, the living and the nonliving. The narrator’s 
depictions of the world reveal his status as an “undead”— a figure that 
hovers between life and death. This figure transgresses the normative 
allocation of agency, vitality, and reflection to the living.  
 
Reflections on the cultural positioning of humans as superior to objects 
reveal the stakes of narration in Berlin Childhood. In response to the 
dominance of Kant’s Copernican revolution in philosophy—which centered 
on positioning humans at the center of phenomenology—adherents to 
“new materialisms” have suggested privileging the object over the subject. 
Mel Chen’s Animacies: Biopolitics, Racial Mattering, and Queer Affect (2012) is 
an original answer to this trend. Animacies portrays the relationship of 
humans to objects as existing not in a binary opposition, but rather on a 
scale of vitality that sorts world phenomena in accordance with livelihood. 
Chen wishes to show “how animacy is defined, tested, and configured via 
its ostensible opposite: the inanimate, deadness, lowness, nonhuman 
animals (rendered as insensate), the abject, the object.”4 Chen contends that 
the differentiation between superior and inferior animacies is ingrained in 
linguistic utterances. Linguistic differentiations between humans, animals, 
and objects always presume, Chen argues, the hierarchy between them. 
Chen opts to depict the interobjective relation of phenomena and world 
objects that goes beyond intersubjective. 
 
In so doing, Chen draws widely on experiments done in early cognitive 
linguistics, which coined the term “animacy” in order to discern the 
preconditions of linguistic references to inanimate and animate objects. 
Animacy is the category that encompasses agency, activity, liveliness, and 
the ability of cognitive performance. Chen seeks to trace “the grammatical 
effects of the sentience or liveness of nouns” as inherent to language.5 
Emphasizing the hierarchy between entities based on their vitality, 
Animacies explores modes of existence that transgress this common 
understanding of reality. One venture point of such a mode is sickness. 
Chen describes how sickness may carry unsociality. The narrator of 
Animacies is recovering from a chronic sickness when their girlfriend walks 
in. She sits next to Chen’s auto-fictional figure in an attempt to offer this 
figure comfort. But healing from an illness, the narrator does not feel the 
girlfriend’s embrace; rather, that narrator is carried away by the embrace of 
the couch on which they are seated—a surprising source of comfort and 
stability. The promise of intersubjectivity gives way to interobjectivity 
when, confessing a lack of vitality in face of a recovery from illness, the 
narrator is associated with the world of things. Chen writes:    
Animacies not only takes into account the broadening field of 
nonhuman life as a proper object, but even more sensitively, the 
                                                             
4 Animacies: Biopolitics, Racial Mattering, and Queer Affect (Durham/London: Duke 
University Press, 2012), 30. 
5 Animacies, 2. 
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animateness or inanimateness of entities that are considered either 
“live” or “dead.”6 
 
Chen’s inquiry destabilizes the view of humans as model agents; the 
investigation of nonhuman life encompasses multiple and concurrent 
trajectories in which inanimate objects shape human sentience.      
  
New understandings of the interaction of objects and individuals sparked 
interest in religious studies and theology. As Clayton Crockett and Jeffrey 
W. Robbins have cogently written, “The New Materialism is a radical 
theological vision, even though it stretches what is usually understood by 
theology almost beyond recognition.”7 Crockett and Robbins’ appeal to the 
New Materialism aims to develop a vision of radical theology. They 
postulate that decentralizing human perspective aligns with ecological 
attempts at restoring the earth in the face of climate change. Another recent 
volume on the topic, Entangled Worlds: Religion, Science and New Materialism, 
opts to depict three trajectories that amalgamate theology and new 
materialisms: investigation of the agency of matter; of “a range of 
theologies, each of which animates materiality as a site of divine 
unfolding”; and of “the ethical and political work that material theologies 
might do” contra “their materiaphobic counterparts.”8 
 
Karen Barad’s contribution to the latter volume straddles these three 
objectives by examining Benjamin’s perception of time. Barad is especially 
interested in Benjamin’s notion of the now-time (Jetztzeit), a momentous 
perception of time that is detached from the continuum of history and is 
charged, consequently, with revolutionary potential. Benjamin’s now-time 
signals the possibility of the “diffraction” of a certain instance from 
cohesive chronology. Barad focuses on Benjamin’s description of this 
moment as an explosion that interrupts the homogeneity of normative 
historical accounts. Explosion signals, in her mind, the affinity between 
Benjamin’s perception of revolutionary potential and accounts that disrupt 
normative science by alerting the scientific prism to the agency of matter 
(such as inquiries into quantum theory). In making this connection she 
discerns that “Objects are not mere metaphors for Benjamin. They are 
instances of sensuous materiality.”9 She stresses, along these lines, that 
Benjamin foregrounds now-time in the attention to the embedding of all 
material beings in eternal transience, in the infinite.10  
 
The dismantling of hierarchies between animate and inanimate beings is 
evident in Berlin Childhood as the work unfolds the emergence of the 
narrator’s sentience. The individual’s bodily functions are active alongside 
the functions of objects. Several sections put a certain inanimate object in 
the center: the telephone, the carousel, the jewelry box. These objects seem 
alive and vital, and their appearance thus solicits a comparison to human 
                                                             
6 Ibid., 10. 
7 Clayton Crockett and Jeffrey W. Robbins, Religion, Politics, and the Earth: The New 
Materialism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), xvi. 
8 “Introduction,” in Catherine Keller and Mary-Jane Rubenstein (eds.) Entangled 
Worlds: Religion, Science, and New Materialisms (New York: Fordham University Press, 
2017), 7. 
9 Karen Barad, “What Flashes Up: Theological-Political-Scientific Fragments” in 
Catherine Keller and Mary-Jane Rubenstein (eds.) Entangled Worlds: Religion, Science, 
and New Materialisms (New York: Fordham University Press, 2017), 30. 
10 Ibid., 63. 
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activity. In so doing, Benjamin’s auto-fictional work transgresses what 
appears to be a normal order of personification (the description of 
inanimate objects in the form of people or animals). The attempt to view a 
vibrant object as human-like reveals a certain dearth: the human presence 
that it would be compared to has not yet been established in the world of 
the text. The “human” is a potential entity rather than a fixed category that 
could delegate its sentience to other objects.  
  
Benjamin’s reflections on a child’s self-awareness present the entrance of 
new technologies to bourgeois life as the backdrop for the awakening of the 
individual’s senses. The child’s development—ostensibly an organic and 
natural process—registers an interruption that penetrates the household. 
New technologies disrupt the order of family life. They intervene with daily 
life and reverberate the metropolitan setting. New domestic objects reshape 
the individual’s relationship to the environment and unravel familial 
communication. Composed throughout the late stage of Benjamin’s writing, 
Berlin Childhood echoes his previous descriptions of the shock that is 
imminent to modern life. 
 
In this way, instead of the personification of objects—the act of describing 
objects as imitating human form and actions—the child, who perceives the 
inanimate objects as lively, learns to emulate their activity. In this process, 
the narrator obtains vitality and becomes human. This dynamic pertains 
especially to new technological appliances whose disruptive impact on 
family life instills anxiety and aggression in the subject. Eiland and Jennings 
write: “on the telephone, which in those days had already attained a 
dominant position in the household, his father sometimes revealed a 
fierceness that contrasted dramatically with his usual affability.”11 The 
adjustment to the new sound technology disrupts the household routine 
and modulates new sensibilities for its members:    
Not many of those who use the apparatus know what devastation it 
once wreaked in family circles. The sounds with which it rang 
between two and four in the afternoon, when a school friend wished 
to speak to me, was an alarm signal that menaced not only my 
parents’ midday nap but the historical era that underwrote and 
enveloped this siesta. […] At that time, the telephone still hung – an 
outcast settled between the dirty-linen hamper and the gasometer – 
in a corner of the back hallway, where its ringing served to multiply 
the terrors of the Berlin household. When, having mastered my 
senses with great effort, I arrived to quell the uproar after prolonged 
fumbling through the gloomy corridor, I tore off the two receivers, 
which were heavy as dumbbells, thrust my head between them, and 
was inexorably delivered over to the voice that now sounded. There 
was nothing to allay the violence with which it pierced me.12   
 
The biographers allude to the role of the telephone in provoking the child’s 
sentience, especially with regard to voice. The fierce ringing of the 
telephone urges the child to seek its source. The mechanical voice hands the 
child to a second voice: the one on the other side of the line. The phone 
delivers the child to the human voice, which, like the phone’s ringing, 
penetrates him violently. These two voices condition a third voice that does 
                                                             
11 Walter Benjamin: A Critical Life, 350. 
12 Berlin Childhood around 1900. Translated by Howard Eiland (Cambridge, 
Mass./London: Harvard University Press, 2006), 49–50. Walter Benjamins Gesammelte 
Schriften VII (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1989), 391. 
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not resound in the episode: the child’s voice. It is presumed that the child’s 
own voice would be provoked by the object’s mechanical sound. However, 
this promise is accompanied by a presentation of human agency as feeble in 
comparison to that of the object. Benjamin’s Dingwelt thus disrupts the 
hierarchy between the subject and the object.  
 
As the telephone episode shows, the ostensible humanity of the objects 
draws on a comparison to a human agency, which is still in the process of 
becoming. In Berlin Childhood, the motions of inanimate objects cannot be 
fully compared to human actions, since the human is always only a promise 
and not yet a concrete materialization. Human sentience develops in the 
text in tandem with the functions of non-living objects. This dynamic 
exposes the individual persona as reliant on the organization of the 
domestic space and, particularly, the positioning of objects in it. The child’s 
senses are modulated in tandem with the reorganization of the household 
around the intrusive presence of new technologies. Personification relies on 
the promise that the human will come into being. The human-like activity of 
objects thus evokes the development of the child, who learns to aim at this 
promise of humanness as reached with adulthood.  
 
 
Urban Echoes at Home 
 
The shuttering effect of technology pertains in the text not only to 
household items, but also to such catalysts of human mobility as trains. 
Importantly, the intrusive presence of the urban landscape in the domestic 
realm provokes the narrator’s emerging sentience. This intrusive influence 
is what one sees in the excerpt “Loggias”: 
The rhythm of the metropolitan railway and of carpet beating rocked 
me to sleep […] Many where the messages embedded in the 
skirmishing of the green roller blinds drawn up high, and many the 
ominous dispatched that I prudently left unopened in the rattling of 
the roll up shutters that came thundering down at dusk.13  
 
This description concerns liminal spaces that disrupt the distinction 
between inside and outside as it is embodied in the common apposition of 
the domestic to the urban sphere. The loggias are contained in the domestic 
realm while also allowing outside impressions (such as dusk) to penetrate 
the home. The succeeding presentation of the loggias suggests that they are 
metonymic to the act of childhood reminiscences, precisely because of the 
spatial liminality that they convey: 
In the years since I was a child, the loggias have changed less than 
other places. This is not the only reason they stay with me. It is 
much more on account of the solace that lies in their un-
inhabitability for one who himself no longer has a proper abode. 
They mark the outer limit of the Berliner’s lodging. Berlin – the city 
god itself – begins in them. The god remains such a presence there 
that nothing transitory can hold its ground beside him. In his 
safekeeping, space and time come into their own and find each 
other. Both of them lies at his feet here.14  
 
In this passage, the divine emerges as an essence that the domestic space 
shares with the metropolitan. The divine element appears to draw its 
                                                             
13 Berlin Childhood, 39–40. GS VII, 386. 
14 Berlin Childhood, 42. GS VII, 387–388. 
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power, or transcendental nature, from the seminal Kantian categories 
pertaining to the human perception of reality: space and time. But in 
Benjamin’s text, the collision of space and time is not the defining human 
feature that focalizes humans’ perception of world phenomena. Quite the 
reverse, these categories are subjected to an inanimate sphere ruled by a 
“city god” (Stadtgott), a term that associates the city with governing patron 
gods. The loggias are the threshold of the domestic, a liminal space that 
marks the room as a miniaturization of the city. Someone who cannot find 
abode, perhaps like the flâneur, can reside in the sphere of the inanimate. 
Emulating a non-human object—the camera—the narrator’s sentience opts 
to emulate the capacities of an object.15 The camera’s ability to document 
outside impressions by capturing images is at the core of this dynamic that 
is alluded to in the irresolute statement that the loggias “have changed less 
than other places.” 
   
Elaine Scarry’s classic study, The Body in Pain, reflects on the influence of 
architectonic structures on human sentience. Scarry investigates practices of 
torture that make use of domestic objects and spaces. Going through 
extreme pain, the individual experiences the collapse of the rudimentary 
function of rooms: 
In normal contexts, the room, the simplest form of shelter, expresses 
the most benign potential of human life. It is, on the one hand, an 
enlargement of the body: it keeps warm and safe the individual it 
houses in the same way the body encloses and protects the 
individual within; like the body, its walls put boundaries around the 
self preventing undifferentiated contact with the world, yet in its 
windows and doors, crude versions of the senses, it enables the self 
to move out into the world and allows that world to enter.16   
 
Scarry highlights the constitutive role of an inanimate unit in creating 
human self-perception. We relate to rooms as emblems of bodily functions. 
Architectonic units shelter individuals, in the same way that the body 
shelters human consciousness. Simultaneously, these units enable 
individuals to sustain a controllable relationship to the outside world. 
These units have windows and doors that, like corporal openings, allow 
individuals to manage their relationship to their outside surroundings.    
 
Their symbolic resemblance to the human body posits both the room and 
the domestic objects in it as the building blocks of civilization:  
[A]s the elemental room is multiplied into a house of rooms and the 
house into a city of houses, the body is carried forward into each 
successive intensification of civilization. In western culture, whole 
                                                             
15 Michael Jennings reads the loggias passage as centering on the penetration of new 
technologies into the domestic realm. According to Jennings, this passage alerts the 
reader to the presence of a technological apparatus that mirrors the act of 
reminiscing: the camera. The shape of this new instrument of recollection parallels 
that of the loggia, a box-like structure whose shutters open and closes sporadically. 
Jennings argues that the shape of the loggias thus evokes two concurrent functions 
of the new photographic technology. The multidimensional infrastructure shows the 
narrator’s gaze to function like that of the photographer. Simultaneously, the same 
domestic space resembles the function of the technological apparatus, the camera 
obscura, in its ability to capture images through its structure. Jennings, Michael W.: 
“The Mausoleum of Youth: Between Experience and Nihilism in Benjamin’s Berlin 
Childhood.” Paragraph 32, no. 3 (2009), 316–317. 
16 Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1985), 38–39. 
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rooms within a house attend to single facts about the body, the 
kitchen and eating, the bathroom and excreting, the bedroom and 
sleeping; so, too, entire cities become attentive to single facts about 
the body, as movement is visible in the car industry in Detroit, or 
eyesight and memory in the film and copying of Rochester. It is, 
though, back in the inward and enclosing space of the single room 
and its domestic content that the outward unfolding […] of 
civilization originates.  One can get accustomed to the function of the 
room as a part of the civilization. One can begin to acknowledge the 
manufactured objects inside the room, like the furniture, as well as 
the position of the room as a part of the building, and the building as 
part of the city.17 
 
Scarry contends that moments wherein the room’s architecture and its 
common objects are used for torture transgress the human control over 
inanimate objects.18 Doors and windows can be slammed, opened, and 
closed harshly—that is, against the will of the prisoner. Such violent actions 
intensify the power of the prison guards as they mark their ultimate control 
over the human body by disrupting the symbolic quality of the room as a 
shelter that magnifies the body. In the same way that the windows and 
doors are opened and slammed violently, against the prisoner’s will, the 
prisoner can no longer shut off his or her own body to the outside world by 
closing the eyes or mouth.  
 
Benjamin’s auto-fictional narrative reflects this potential hazard. The text 
proposes that architectural and self-contained structures like the room, the 
apartment, and the city modulate not merely the human body, but also the 
human historical reflection. Berlin Childhood offers a narrative of a history 
that transcends the temporal limitation of human life. In doing so, the text 
theorizes a perception of time that transgresses the linearity of common 
historiography. In employing the figure of the messianic that recurs in 
Benjamin’s oeuvre, Berlin Childhood alludes to a perspective toward history 
that transcends human sentience.  
 
To use Scarry’s language, “while the room is a magnification of the body, it 
is simultaneously a miniaturization of the world, of civilization.”19 The 
location of the household in the metropolitan expresses a unique transition 
from the first conundrum in Berlin Childhood—the view that inanimate 
objects, which determine the subject’s form, exist before the subject —to the 
second: the realization that inanimate objects are likely to exist after the 
subject whose sentience they provoked. In discussing Benjamin’s 1928 
Origin of German Tragic Drama (Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels), Eric 
Santner has opted to demonstrate the transgression of the domain of 
human existence that is caused by an animal-like perception that he terms 
“creaturely life” and that is featured, in Santner’s mind, in writings by 
Benjamin, Rilke, and Sebald.20 Santner takes The Origin of German Tragic 
Drama to explicate the intertwining of creaturely life with an account of 
history that deprioritizes human life as the object at its center. This 
perspective toward history exposes the independence of the inanimate 
                                                             
17 Ibid., 39.  
18 Ibid., 40. 
19 Ibid., 38. 
20 Eric L. Santner, On Creaturely Life: Rilke, Benjamin, Sebald (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2006). 
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objects and framework, which grants human history meaning, from a 
human viewpoint on history. Referring to Benjamin’s notion of natural 
history (Naturgeschichte), Santner argues that this term pertains “not to the 
fact that nature also has a history but to the fact that the artifacts of human 
history tend to acquire an aspect of mute, natural being at the point where 
they begin to lose their place in a viable form of life (think of the process 
whereby architectural ruins are reclaimed by nature).”21 Berlin Childhood 
exhibits the viable possibility that inanimate objects may outlive the subject 
that emerges through the interaction with them. Adding to the engagement 
with domestic objects and architectonic units as preceding the individual 
(and conditioning his sentience), it appears that urban sites are likely to 
outlive the humans who inhabit them, the humans to whose life they have 
given meaning. Berlin Childhood exhibits in this way Benjamin’s conception 
of historiography: it experiments with a historical narration that 
deprioritizes the human perspective as the leading prism to the 
transformation of the world.  
 
 
Historical Perception and Messianic Hope 
 
The attempt to conceptualize a new form of historical narration builds on 
seminal tropes of Benjamin’s thought. Benjamin’s unpublished fragment 
number 174 describes childhood as a phase of sharp sentience. However, 
instead of yielding the expectation of the child’s future exploration of the 
world, this phase leads to a blurring of past and present:  
Is the intensity with which we, as children, absorb the world, but 
also images, rhyme, etcetera, not mixed together with some kind of 
presentiment? So that many of the things of which we are 
reminded in later life do not just remind us of actual situations, but 
also of presentiments.22                     
 
At first glance, the fragment appears to make a counterintuitive argument. 
Culture perceives the child’s consciousness as a tabula rasa. To use Chen’s 
terminology, children are commonly ascribed enhanced animacy because 
they have a long life ahead of them. Benjamin’s fragment overturns this 
expectation. The child’s first impressions evoke a sense of presentiment 
(Vorahnung). Rather than pure, empty, or blank, the child’s impressions are 
laden with future repetitions. This dynamic makes it hard to locate the one 
original memory (because memories are embedded per definition in a set of 
repetitions). In other words, presentiment is a sensation that transgresses 
the temporal distinctions “present” and “past.” Sigrid Weigel has mapped 
Benjamin’s conceptualization of images in referring to his understanding of 
temporality and cognition: 
The trace of many images […] inscribes comparable figurations in 
Benjamin’s writings: first encounter—fascinated contemplation of the 
image and impression, or being touched; latency—the image in one’s 
                                                             
21 Ibid., 17. 
22 Sollte nicht der Intensität, mit der wir als Kinder die Welt, aber auch Bilder, Reime 
etc aufnehmen, sich etwas von Vorahnung beimischen? So daß vieles im spätern 
Leben, was uns erinnert, nicht sowohl an wirkliche Situationen als an Vorahnungen 
uns erinnert (GS VI, 204). Tom Vandeputte’s translation of fragment 174 was 
prepared for a workshop on intensity in Walter Benjamin’s philosophy, an event that 
took place at the Forschungsinstitut für Philosophie Hannover. I thank Tom 
Vandeputte for allowing me to use his translation and the entire group of 
participants for the fruitful discussions of the term. 
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head, as an imaginary vis-à-vis the reflection; thought-image—the 
discussion of the image and the generation of a dialectical image 
within theory.23 
 
Weigel’s notion of “the generation of a dialectical image” in Benjamin’s 
oeuvre resonates with the temporal split provoked by childhood memories. 
Children’s presentiment is taken as ingrained in both their experiences and 
in the later recollection of these experiences. Presentiment cancels out, 
therefore, the status of images as “original” and the understanding of 
recollections as mere replicas of an original experience.  
 
The term “intensity” that characterizes this volatile temporality of images in 
fragment 174 relates in Benjamin’s oeuvre to a perception of time that is 
laden by theology. In his 1921 “Theological-Political Fragment,” a text that 
develops the terms that will become eminent to his theories of history, 
Benjamin wrote about “the messianic intensity of the heart,” an affect 
driven by a mystic concept of history: 
If one directional arrow marks the goal in which the dynamic of the 
profane takes effect and another, the direction of messianic intensity, 
then clearly the pursuit of happiness of free humanity strives away 
from every messianic direction. But just as a force is capable, through 
its direction, of promoting another in the opposite direction, so too is 
the profane order of the profane in the coming of the messianic 
kingdom. The profane, therefore, is not a category of the kingdom 
but a category – that is, one of the most appropriate – of its most 
quiet nearing. For in happiness everything earthly strives for its 
decline and only in happiness is the decline determined to find it. 
While clearly the unmediated messianic intensity of the heart, of the 
inner, individual person, passes through tragedy, in the sense of 
suffering.24 
 
Like the more famous figure, the “angel of history,” the image of the heart 
pronounces the anticipation of an apocalyptic future. The vision of 
apocalypse dispels the connotation of a future with development. 
“Intensity” is the driving force behind this transgression. Intensity heralds a 
form of individuality of a believer who detaches him or herself from 
collective convictions. Messianic intensity is a reflection on history that 
dispels the view of the future as the culmination of linear progress. 
Happiness that is grounded in messianic aspirations, as opposed to forms 
of happiness that are centered on this world, bounds the individual to a 
negation of the earthly (as resembled in “tragedy”).25 Happiness driven by 
messianic aspirations thus contradicts the common association of happiness 
with prosperity. Quite the reverse, “messianic happiness” entails not 
                                                             
23 “The Flash of Knowledge and the Temporality of Images: Walter Benjamin’s 
Image-Based Epistemology and Its Preconditions in Visual Arts and Media History,” 
Critical Inquiry 41 (Winter 2015), 352. 
24 The fragment and its translation are available in Eric Jacobson’s “Understanding 
Walter Benjamin’s Theological-Political Fragment,” Jewish Studies Quarterly 8, no. 3 
(2001): 207. 
25 As Jacobson writes “In Benjamin, it is clear that the world must pass away but its 
passing can only be achieved through happiness. This happiness is at once 
constituted to be worldly and, at the same time, messianic, in the sense of being 
directed toward messianic activity. In this respect, the focus of this development, 
based on happiness, turns to the motor of redemption” (Ibid., 229). 
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merely the decline of the profane world, but also the decline of its notion of 
linear progress.  
 
 
The Meaning of Time: Inanimate Perspectives 
 
The vision of historical consciousness that negates the world of the living 
guides the notion of temporality in Berlin Childhood as manifested in the 
narrator’s spatial and temporal orientation in the world. As Anja Lemke 
cogently shows, Berlin Childhood portrays a counterintuitive picture of the 
child: the newly born is closer to death than to life. She writes that, “The 
topography of the city is not only the access to the structure of one’s life, 
but is a link to the realm of the dead. In the houses, streets and squares, the 
urban space preserves the traces of the past as a stone testimony to the 
dead.”26 The child’s presence is that of a ghostly observer who reflects on 
the urban sites out of a direct connection to death. The childhood 
recollections are the attempt to return to the experience of the world 
(Lemke uses the word “Erlebnis”) through this prism of the proximity to 
death. This freedom of signification parallels the child’s peculiar animacy. 
 
Peter Szondi has claimed that Benjamin reads Proust as trying to escape the 
future by clinging to the past, and that Berlin Childhood is exactly contrasted 
with this attempt: “the future is precisely what Benjamin seeks in the 
past.”27 Benjamin’s reflections on childhood prove to be a venture point for 
the unfolding of a unique perception of history in his entire oeuvre. The 
figure of the child is synonymous with vitality. It holds the promise of pure 
and sharp sentience and further cognitive development. Benjamin 
transgresses these cultural conventions. His displacement of animate bodies 
with inanimate objects results in a broader reflection on the linear 
perception of time. 
 
Benjamin’s depiction of the child as cohabiting in the so-called realm of the 
dead—in the symbolic forms of the city which have outlived the people 
whose lives they formed—resonates with the child’s  cohabitation with the 
inanimate. The child’s ghostly regard in the city reveals a paradoxical mode 
of agency. The narrator’s activity in telling a historical account adheres to 
latency that is culturally associated with the inanimate. The narrator’s 
recollections transgress the distinction of vitality from death. Benjamin’s 
amalgamation of childhood reminiscences with urban history equips his 
narrator with sentience that exceeds normative historiography; these auto-
fictional recollections establish a narrator that embraces the inanimate, ergo 
the culturally inferior, while undertaking a historiographical gaze that 
appeals to the order that exceeds human life.    
 
                                                             
26 Gedächtnisräume des Selbst: Walter Benjamins "Berliner Kindheit um neunzehnhundert" 
(Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2005), 32–33 (my translation). 
27 “Hope in the Past: On Walter Benjamin.” Critical Inquiry 4, no. 3 (1978): 499. 
